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Critical Appraisal of Linguistic Philosophy

One may conveniently classify different periods in the career of European philosophy. For example, the 17th Century is sometimes called the Age of Rationalism as the dominant note of philosophy in this century has been rationalism. In the 18th Century the dominant note of philosophy has been empiricism and the dominant note of 19th Century has been idealism. Likewise one may claim that the dominant note of 20th Century philosophy is analysis. Of course there are other philosophical movements to-day as there have been other philosophical cross-currents in other periods. But the key-position of this century in the field of philosophy is analysis. So much so that the exercises in analytic philosophy is regarded an important pedagogic requirement for any subject at the University. Linguistic philosophy is just a variety of analytic philosophy having emphasis on its linguistic side and the problems or issues arising out of it.

In one sense there has been analytic or linguistic philosophy all along the philosophical career. Socratic inquiry into the nature of such concepts as piety, courage, knowledge (in the Platonic dialogues) is just different exercises in analysis. Plato's investigation into the concept of justice in his "Republic", Berkeley on matter, Hume's discussion on causation and on freedom of will may serve further excellent examples of analysis or philosophy of language. Plato argues from common names to his realm of Ideas and Aristotle argues for onotological priority of substance because verbs require nominative subjects. In fact all great philosophers have been doing linguistic philosophy in one form or another.

Again analysis is a necessary exercise for in order to probe into any matter one needs clarity and unambiguity in expressions and thoughts. Without such an exercise one cannot argue and reason out logically and fruitfully for one's thesis. But in general this is simply to serve some ulterior philosophical motive. Analysis itelf was not usuelly thought to solve any philosophical problems. The implicit view was that proper philosophy concerned in knowing the reality and for that purpose certain proofs or rational arguments are needed. Analysis or clarity in thought and expression is to be there in order to equip a philosopher better for such argumentations. The purpose of analysis was thus secondary : it itself does not do the right philosophical job of finding out reality. Although some analytic exercises performed by some philosophers (e.g. Hume on freedom of will) went beyond such an implied view of analysis, it was never explicitly realized or advocated as a philosophical tool to resolve metaphysical or philosophical riddles. It is only in the 20th century that analysis was consciously and explicitly regarded as the proper philosophical exercise to solve philosophical perplexities and issues. The dominant note for the upholders of analytic philosophers has been that it is the only activity which a philosopher needs to pursue and it is the only genuine and proper tool which a philosopher has for doing philosophy. With such an unprecedented keynote analytical or linguistic philosophy has gained its influence and central place in the philosophical circles of almost all the universities of the world. Hence it is not an exaggeration to call our present age in the philosophical career as the Age of Analysis. Never before in the history of philosophy analysis was regarded as a method of philosophy in an explicit and conscious way, never it was regarded earlier as the sole method of philosophy, and never it was regarded as a genuine or the only genuine philosophical activity. Unconsciously or implicitly several philosophers have done some work, which fore-tastes 20th Century conception of analysis ; but

explicitly, consciously and as an avowed programme only 20th century philosophers came out with this novel conception or definition of philosophy as analysis.

Analytical or linguistic philosophy is not a name given to one definite system of philosophy. There is no exact line which all analysts follow : there is no commonly shared positive doctrine. We need the word "analysis" in Chemistry where a chemist is interested in analysing or breaking or reducing a physical substance into its constituting parts. A chemist tries to know what are the elements or ultimate stuffs which go to form the physical substance in question. A grammarian would try to sort out the lingual structure of the language concerned. He would classify various types of sentences and would break a sentence into its parts from grammatical point of view. A philosophical analyst endeavours to analyse the conceptual paraphernalia which the past philosophers have hitherto hammered out for their purposes and he would examine our various concepts and conceptual framework from logical point of view. He would try to bring out the logic exhibited implicitly or explicitly in our thoughts and concepts. Now as our thinkers and concepts are expressed in our language, his dominating interest would lie in discovering the essential logic embedded in language. Thus, a philosopical analyst would try to analyse language and would study its logical basis, its logical structure, its logical rules, its logical possibilities and impossibilities. In pursuing such an exercise various analysts would have different starting-points and would adopt diverse methods or courses in short, they would adopt different philosophies Linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language in order to achieve the purpose above-mentioned may bank solely upon language as it is or may try to evolve some improved or perfect language. Once again, as concepts and thoughts are expressed in language, linguistic philosophy is not infrequently equated with analytical philosophy in general.

In such a situation an approach to the genesis of analytical philosophy or linguistic philosophy would be the best way of being acquainted with it. Analytical philosophy emerged contemporaneous with logical atomism and also in an important sense it is a necessary corllary to it.

At Cambridge in early 20th century reaction again neo-idealism built up. Moore and Russell argued against Bradley's theory of nternal relations and in the specific case of perception maintained the distinction between the perceiver and the perceived. In this connection Moore very ably, elaborately, skillfully and effectively analysed such concepts as sense-data, external object, consciousness. Moore had a commonsensical approach to concepts. For example in his 'Proof of an External World' he offers a very simple and com monsensical proof for the existence of external world. He would raise his one hand and say something like this : Here is my right hand, therefore one external object exists ; here is my left hand, theiefore another external object exists. This argument exploits our common way of understanding and approaching the concept of an external object. It is a saner view to accept that there exists an external object on such grounds as seeing or sensing. If anybody says : 'look, here is my pen' and I see it or feel it by touch, then it is sensible to trust that there is an external object. Only a schizophreniac suffering from hallucinations and delusions may doubt and mistrust such a claim. However and howsomuch an idealist may weave his theories and twist his arguments, we should not be bewitched by it. Moore forcefully and convincingly clarifies the concept of a physical object as obviously embedded in our language in this way : being such as to be met with in space', 'being accessible to one or more senses' 'being such that one mind could perceive it at two different times or that more than one mind could perceive it at the same time' etc. So Moore used his common-

sensical analysis to uproot idealistic stand and paved the way for realism. It was thus due to linguistic philosophy that a new approach to philosophy dawned.

Russell had genuine logico-mathematical puzzles to resolve. He could not agree that the validity of mathematics and logic was empirically based. So he took a somersault from his position of neo-Hegalianism to that of extreme realism. Not only he admitted Meinongian world of numbers and classes but also of propositions and every sort of entity entertained by a mind. Take the proposition : "The present King of France is wise". The entity "The present King of France" must exist in some sense if the sentence is true or false. If the sentence is true it is about the present King of France, which must exist in some sense, otherwise how the sentence could be true. If it is false, it means that it is true that the present King of France is not wise and hence here as well the present King of France must exist in some sense. Not only this, this sentence cannot even be meaningful if the presnet King of France does not exist in some sense, for it is about the present King of France. And this sort of argument may be extended to any sort of entity, say, to 'square-circle'. Now take the sentence "A square-circle does not exist". But it leads to self-contradiction if we suppose the existence of square-circle. The matter could be avoided by saying that the existence (—— call it subsistence, if one may like) of square-circle is of different sort from the existence of ordinary physical objects. But the absurdity comes to the surface that by dealing this way one is regarding a too much swollen shadowy world as real world than we could normally admit. So Russell was led to apply Occam's Razor in order to reduce the Meinongian world thus posited to the minimum. For this purpose he used two logico-philosophical methods viz. his theory of description and logical construction. These are nothing but analytical tools. So for his purpose analysis

was a "Must". Such an analysis was not merely knowing clearly the meaning of the words or concepts involved : it was meant to resolve philosophical questions and to get at the reality. Russell's efforts proved successful in his logic and so he was hopeful that this would lead him to success in other fields of philosophy. He appeared successful in his logicism in reducing various kinds of numbers to classes and further classes to propositional functions. That is, mathematical entities e. g. numbers are logical constructs out of classes (a number being a class of classes having certain corresponding definite members). We need not and should not suppose existence to logical constructs : we need to attribute existence only to the irreducibles. Thus numbers do not exist or subsist as they are logical constructs out of classes. Applying this concept of logical construction we may argue that the concept of nation is a logical construct out of men and a physical object is a logical consruct out of sense-data. This implies that neither nation nor a physical object exist as such. What is immediately preceived viz. data, have real existence. Moving further in this direction Russell was led to formulate his thesis of Neutral Monism. That is the real existing entities are sense-data, which are neither mental nor physical and both minds and physical objects are just logical constructs out of this neutral stuff called sense-data. Russell's other analytical tool viz. theory of description was meant to correct the logic of sentences. Such expressions as the definite descrip tion (the so-and-so) or indefinite description (a so-and-so) are systematically misleading expressions, as they appear to occur as subjects of propositions but really they are not logical subjects. According to Russell the so-and-so cannot serve as a logical subject in a proposition. A logical subject must exist and a logically proper name must denote a certain logical subject. Thus, Russell would analyse the proposition above-mentioned "The present King of France is wise" into three proposition :

(i) T here is present King of France.

(ii) There is not more than one present King of France.

(iii) There is nothing which is a present King of France and is not wise.

Now these three propositions form a conjunction and according to Russell's logic even if only one conjuct is false, then the whole conjunction is to be regarded false. As (i) is false, the proposition "The present King of France is wise" is also false. The proposition in question is grammatically a one sentence and appears to express one proposition, but in reality it is compounded of three propositions by a logical conjunction.

It is not our present task to critically examine the merits and demerits, the correctness or incorrectness of the analysis of this or other similar propositions. What is relevantly important here is the urgency and importance of analysis to resolve logico-philosophical status of certain propositions. Here Russell wants to bring home the point that such propositions are not of subject-predicate form. In a genuine subject-predicate proposition, the subject must exist to whom something is predicated. All the three components or conjucts of the proposition under discussion are in fact general propositions involving quantifiers and thus they express certain relation between certain concepts, and not between particulars or between a particular and a concept. "The present King of France" is in fact a descriptive phrase : it is not a genuine or logically proper name and thus does not refer necessarily to any existing object. Stretching this point leads to the concept of Ideal or Perfect Language. Just like Russell was eager to create a perfect and precise symbolic language of logic in his *Principia Mathematica*, he was also keen to correct the logico epistemological blunders and apparent or implied mistakes, and with the help of his logical language to fill up lacunae or omissions and to reexpress ordinary idioms and sentences into philosophically, epistemologically or logically adequate propositions.

This is a planned analytic programme, like of which never prior to 20th century was undertaken. And there is nothing but a linguistic philosophy to correct ordinary language and to evolve a perfect language, such that from the very face of any proposition one may read into its logical character.

We just mentioned that logical subjects have to be existing particulars. They have to be real individuals and not just fiction of mind. They have to be ultimates or irreducible particulars, about whom something may be predicated or said. We use the expression "proper name" to denote one unique individual. Following this linguistic convention Russell uses an expression ' logically proper name" to denote ultimate particulars". Thus by such a legislation of definition a logically proper name must denote a unique particular. Russell because of his philosophical background and approach of logical construction and analysis was led to regard sense-data as ultimate particulars. It means that the real world would constitute a sense-data and their properties or their inner structures. This led to full-fledged logical atomism. A fact arising out of any one sense-datum should be mirrored or pictured by the corresponding proposition. And as one proposition is independent of any other one, each facts of the world is to be independent of another. Structure of the perfect languge must be that of logic of Russell's *Principia Mathematica* So there is no causal or internal relation among facts or sense-data. Wittgenstein was more logical and consistent in holding the doctrine of logically proper names. He appeared to have consistently and persistently pursued the idea of subject-predicate. Thus an ultimate subject or particular is that about whom something can be said. That is, it has all the possibilities of acquiring properties : it may combine with other particulars to give rise to fact. It means that a solitary particular cannot have its selected characteristic. For

example, we cannot say of any particular that it is red. It is only joining with other particulars that such properties as being red emerge. A logically proper name, as Russel asserted, has only denotation and correspondingly the particular denoted by it is devoid of any description or properties. Thus Wittgenstein's particulars or ultimate objects are highly metaphysical and imperceptible. This is because the structure of language logically compels us to admit such particulars. If we take a sense-datum, say of a red patch, as a particular then how to express it without a proper name. We may say : 'it is red' or 'this is a red patch'. Now if "it" or "this" is taken as sense-data, then in his particular example it would amount to a tautologous or analytic statement : "The sensed red patch is red". The problem is a general one. If an ultimate subject, that is a particular, has a certain intrinsic property, then a sensible question 'emergrs what has this property ?' This 'what' is a particular which has all the potentialities of acquiring certain properties. According to Wittgenstein this emergence of property is the result of making a configuration with other particulars. A particular has in it all possibilities of its combining with other particulars. An atomic state of affairs is built out of configuration of particulars : thus a solitary particular can never give rise to fact or state-of-affairs. Such a line of thought leads to Wittgensteinian logical atomism. Atomic facts (..... as configurations of particulars) are to be adequately mirrored by corresponding atomic propositions, and these are the only kinds of facts. The only facts obtain in the world are independent, unconnected atomic facts. Our language constitutes of intricate, involved and complicated phrases and sentences. They need to be properly analysed and are to be broken upto into atomic propositions obeying truth-functional logic of Principia Mathematica, which should picture atomic facts or atomic states of affairs. This is the ideal or goal of a philosopher.

Russell was led to adopt analytic tools of logical construction and

theory of description. He was thus led to conclude that ordinary proper names like Bertrand Russell, Socrates, Aftab and also proper names in fables like Huma, Pegasus are in reality descriptive. Logically proper names are only to be denotative : thus only examples of logically proper names would be 'this', 'that' 'it'. Thus purpose of such exercise was to reduce drastically the ludicious and unbelievable swollen Meinongian realm. But in doing this alongwith his faith in symbolic logic he could not avoid propounding his logical atomism. In return logical atomism of any brand necessarily implies analysis to its concept of independent particular facts and its picture theory of meaning and truth. Acceptance of logical atomism and opposing analysis means holding inconsistent beliefs and adopting unphilosophical and inharmonious attitude. It is not the purpose of this brief paper to examine and criticize logical atomism as such even succintly, but it is necessary to understand that further linguistic philosophy developed out of realization that logical atomistic philosophical programme was impossible and that this doctrine had incurable flaws and hence implausible. The programme of logical construction proved failure and no amount of reduction of any physical object into sense-data could be satisfactorily achieved. Such a task was found to be not only technically impossible but also logically or philosophically impossible. The concept of logically proper names began to appear as a mock-concept We use proper names so that they could be used to refer objects in question even when they are not present before us. But sense-data are fleeting and according to Russell unless the objects are present before our consciousness we cannot make a judgment about them. Thus any proper name (including 'this' or 'that') given to a particular becomes a description, as soon as we try to re-refer it. With the breakdown of the concept of logically proper name Russell's theory of description also cracks down. Furthermore the analysis of sentences, for example, having definite description was

shown to be defective. As Professor P. F. Strawson pointed out that in the event of non-existence of the grammatical subject we cannot talk about the truth/falsity of the statement in question. Thus the question of truth or falsity of the statement "The present King of France is wise" does not arise, but according to Russell's logical analysis it turns out to be false. Russell had another difficulty of handling with quantified or general or universal propositions. A simple atomic proposition (.. ..having logically proper name or names) is meaningful because it somehow corresponds or pictures particular atomic fact which contain only constituents (.. . i.e. particulars) and components (i. e. character or relation). But how such a picture theory of meaning is to be maintained in case of quantified (having all or some) propositions. Thus Russell was led to have another kind of facts, called general facts corresponding to general propositions. In the same vein he was led to declare the existence of negative facts. For how such a proposition as "Socrates is not alive" may be regarded meaningful and true unless it corresponds to fact that Socrates is not alive. In fact any correspondence theory of truth must face such a difficulty, in particular theory of meaning and truth. Russell also reluctantly accepted intentional facts, for propositions expressing them could not be reduced into truth-functions of atomic propositions. By accepting general facts Russell inadvertently fell into inconsistency. For a logical atomist the world has the same structure as the logical structure of Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. So, basic facts are to be independent from eachother and are not causally or somehow internally related with each other, Hume had certain psycho-epistemological considerations to deny causal nexus, but logical atomists had logical considerations. Now, according to Russell universal propositions like 'all S is P' have no existential import and are reducible to hypothetical propositions as for every x, if x is f, then x is h'. Now, this compound hypothetical propo ion by his own logic is regarded a truth function of two propositions, of antecedent

and of consequent. Hence as these propisitions are logically inde-
pendent so should be the corresponding facts. But the admittance
of independent general facts means renunciation of such a logical
analysis Wittgenstein maintained only one kind of basic facts viz.
atomic facts. No doubt he retained the beauty and simplicity of
his logical atomism by this way, but he could not adequately
answer the objections or considerations which led Russell to accept
general facts, negative facts and intentional facts.

Wittgenstein has particular difficulties for his picture theory of
meaning. His particulars are not Russellian sense data : they are
rather more akin to visual points, rather more like geometrical
points ! How any ordinary sentence can be reduced to independent
atomic propositions, each of which is just configurations of logically
proper names representing particulars. No logical atomist, including
Wittgenstein, has been able to explain adequately or to provide
explicit guidelines how to bring out in the analysis the structure of
atomic propositions, which should mirror so called atomic facts.
Again Wittgenstein has his theory of showing. For example, certain
logical formulae or principles and mathematical equations have
certain transparency : their validity or truth cannot be put in words
but they show themselves that they are valid. Wittgenstein extended
this notion of transparency to the structures of propositions.
Logical principles and mathematical propositions are themselves
reducible to logical forms. He showed logical principles with
the help of his own invention of tautologies and thus showed
how they must hold true for all possible worlds. Aristotle had
declared four types of logical forms of propositions. Thus ordi-
nary grammatical propositions which appear to have different forms
(e.g, 'graduates alone are eligible') could be shown to be
reducible to one of these standard Aristotelean logical forms (in
the example cited, to 'all eligibles are graduates'). The difference

here was only extension of such logical forms to include relational propositions, and that no restriction on the number of such logical forms could be put. An atomic proposition mirrors an atomic fact when both have identical structure and by virtue of such an identity we come to realize the sense of proposition. Further, this very structure may be exhibited in a various types of models, in arrangement of material books, in a piece of music or sculpture or painting. The identity of structure is exhibited but cannot be described. Such a structure is a form of reality, which can be shown but cannot be said. If such a thing could be said, it will make a genuine and true metaphysic. Identity in structure is only shown, say, in a certain piece of music or architecture, in a painting, in a proposition or in the real fact, in the psychical thought or in the arrangement of blocks. A logical form shows its sense. These logical forms are foundations of all reality, of all language, of all models. The question naturally emerges what could be done if there is a difference of opinion as to what sort of facts or models have identical logical forms. One person sees a certain identity between a certain piece of music and a proposition, but another person fails to see any common logical form in them and may find discord instead of harmony. Later investigations, including those of Wittgenstein himself revealed that the concept of such logical forms was based on misconception. The so-called logical forms are the product of certain contextual situations. These forms are forms only in relation to certain arguments and emerge in making certain inferences, in achieving certain results, in playing certain games, Thus in different contexts the same proposition may acquire different forms. In different cultures, in different moods and under different circumstances different common structures may by sensed by different persons in different forms of arts.

With the breakdown of the theory of meaning which includes such concepts as logical forms and identity of structure in different models

or facts, doctrine of showing, concept of logically proper name and ultimate or simple particulars or objects, the backbone of logical atomism also broke down. Logical atomism also received a severe blow from the general prevalent philosophic mood against metaphysics. Logical atomism is a metaphysical doctrine, hence it is to be rejected. The anti-metaphysical tendency was particularly exhibited among scientifically oriented Viennese thinkers, scientists and philosophers, which later form a group, known as Vienna Circle. Moritz Schlick jo'ned this circle as early as 1922 and proved the most powerful spokesman of Logical Positivism. The name of Logical Positivism gained more currency than other names like Logical Empilicism, Scientific Empiricism, Logical Neo-positivism given to various views of this circle. The key-doctrine of Logical Positivism is its verification principle, according to which the meaning or significance of a sentence lies in its method of empirical verificatioe. If there cannot be any conceivable way to verify it by empirical observation, it is to be regarded meaningless. Of course Logical Positivists admitted another cass of meaningful sentences viz. analytical propositions, for example of mathematics and logic but they do not describe or tell something about the world. If followed that metaphysical propositions, for example, about the Absolute or God, about the Platonic world of Ideas, about Spinoza's psychophysical parallelism, are insignificant or meaningless. We can have limited and finite sense-experiences, hence the all-encompassing Absolute or God is unverifiable. We can conceive of conditions under which a proposition. for example, "There are green snakes roaming about on certain rocky surface of the sun "is empirically verifiable and hence it is meaningful. Again, as ethics deals with the realm of values and not of facts, ethical statements are in principle unverifiable and hence they are unmeaning. Some Logical Positivists, for example professor Ayer, adopted emotive theory of ethics, that ethical statements are just expressions of our emotions, our likes or

dislikes. In short they tried to reduce ethics into psychology, or into sociology, all knowledge of facts into scieniiflc facts. This view, however otherwise myopic it may be, could only be consistently upheld if there were ultimately only atomic propositions, because only such propositions are in principle strongly or conclusively verifiable. By atomic propositions Logical Positivists would understand those which are fully evidenced directly by sence-experience. But there are universal statements like "all cows are white" which cannot be wholly verified, for we cannot observe all the crows, presently living or yet to be born. Professor Karl Popper offered a falsifiability criterion for meaningful sentences : that a sentence is meaningful when it is in principle falsifiable. Thus the above universal statement can be falsifled by observing even a single instance of cow which is black or non-white But then a simple existential statement like 'A crow exists' cannot be falsified, and hence should be deemed meaningless under falsifiability criterion. Even the joint criteria of verifiability and falsifiability cannot do justice to many sentences which are regarded meaningful in our daily discourse e g. "every man is disturbed by some event which would happen in one's life". Again, in our scientific world we have cencepts and entities like electrons, protons, gravitational field, hypotheses and theories which cannot be conclusively verified or falsified. Even we cannot talk of other minds. Hence Logical Positivists had to shift over to weak verifiability principle : that is, a sentence is meaningful if there is some empirical justification or confirmation (..... and not conclusive verification) for it. But on this weaker principle metaphysical theories like psycho-physical parallelism and metaphysical entities like the Absolute or God can become meaningful. For example one may hold that design and purpose observed in nature justify the existence of God. Some Logical Positivists like Carnap began to talk of general statements as though not propositions at all, but only rules or laws about which

we cannot say whether they are true or false. This appeared repug-
nant both to common-sense and science. Again there appeared a
problem how to justify the meaningfulness of such 'empirical'
principles of meaningfulness. If they are just rules, other philoso-
phers may have their own rules for some better reasons. In fact the
statements in question are to be meaningful prior to any verification.
Thus some thinkers were led to have limited aim of separating
scientific statements by such principles from metaphysical statements
though accepting the meaningfulness of them. But to evolve such a
criterion also proved vain. Thus Logical Positivism had to be
abandoned even by some loyal supporters.

It may be noted that Logical Positivists had almost the same
sort of linguistic or analytic programme as Logical Atomists. In
order to show the meaningfulness of certain sentences, hypo-
theses or scientific entities they needed to analyse them to sentences
having empirical contents. Analysis would help them to determine
the meaningfulness or genuineness of scientific concepts. For
example it was claimed that the concept of simultaneity as claimed
or modified by Einstein's theory of relativity is in fact a logical
or analytical discovery and not a factual or scientific one. If
scientists had attended to the notion of simultaneity and
analysed it, they would have long ago reached at the relativistic
view of simultaneity. Furthermore for their analysis Logical Positi-
vists adhered to the truth-funcitonal logic. The logical constructions
went on as earlier. In their efforts to analyse the talk of physical
objects into the talk of sense-data they found it an impossible task.
Hence, theory of phenomenalism had to be abandoned or changed.
Again their efforts to reduce all mathematics and logic to analytic
propositions they did wonderful exercises with or without reference
to axiomatic system in the form of formalism or conventionalism
Logical Positivists had strict dichotomy of meaningful sentences into

empirical and analytic propositions and they characterized the former ones to be synthetic, aposteriori and contingent, but the latter ones to be analytic, apiriori and necessary. In their efforts to show this they did very fruitful and illuminating exercises. Philosophers soon discovered that such a neat and precise division cannot be maintained and also that mathematics cannot be reduced to logic or analytic statements. So useful and illuminating distinctions were made within such concepts as analytic, synthetic, apriori, necessary : some synthetic propositions like "There are infinite number of numbers", "Colour is extended" have to be regarded synthetic and necessary and some analytic statements have to be regarded necessary though not based on convention. Logical positivists regarded philosophy as analysis to justify the language of science and of ordinary men. So many critical remarks which are relevant for logical atomism hold good here too. With develop ment of many valued logic and different axiomatic systems for the same purpose changes occurred in the views that a meaningful sentence must be either true or false and that there need to be ultimate basic propositions and logical forms. It was also found that extensional logic, say, of *Principia Mathcmatica* cannot adequately mirror the structure of our ordinary language. For example, entailment relation cannot be adequately expressed by truth functional constants employed in logical system do not display properly the logic of lingual connectives. Professor Quine showed that the notion of analyticity is vague and cannot be analysed in terms of notion of, say, synonymy. Thus a new wave of philosophical inspiration was needed. Both Logical Atomism and Logical Positivism appeared inadequate to cope with the growing variety of analytical exercises and a new era of language philosophy started to blossom. Language philosophy released itself from the criteria of meaningfulness either of picture theory of Logical Atomism or of verificable or falsifiable principle of Logical Positivism. And this movement is also a necessary outcome of these priorisms, and many

of Logical Atomists through self-criticism joined in this camp and brought forth different ideas and pursued different lines.

In this connection it is illuminating to mention Carnap (8191) one of the chief exponents of Logical Positivism. He tried to give phenomenalistic or sense-datum basis for his constitution system of epistemology, so as to reduce concepts of physical objects, of other minds, of private psychical objects, of socio-cultural realms in terms of sense-data with the help of idea of similarity. Later disgusted by solipsism imbedded in sense-data under the influence of Neurath he moved to reduce the above concepts and statements in terms of physicalistic language (instead of sense-data language) for physical language he found to be intersensual, inter-subjective and universal and scientifically acceptable. So entire language of science was to be constructed on physicalistic basis. Still later Carnap discovered weaknesses and flaws in the verifiability principle and moved more and more to just analysis and study of language. His formal investigations in logic and mathematics inspired by Russell and Hilbert led him to make a distinction between the object-language (the language directly about objects) and the meta-language, in which we talk about object-language. He concluded that metalanguage is better suited for philosophy and logical analysis than object-language. Object-language (in which we ordinarily talk) leads to philosophical perplexities and blunders and hence to be avoided. So, he came to emphasize more and more the importance of philosophy or analysis of language and tried to show the way by actual examples how to clarify ordinary language in terms of meta-language. For example, in material mode (i.e. in object language) we say that a pen is a thing. In formal mode or in metalanguage we should clarify its logic by saying that 'pen' is a 'thing' word. In material mode we say that brownness is a quality, that seven is a number that it is a fact that the desk is brown. But the same may be stated in formal logic with its obvious logic

as : 'brown' is an adjective", 'seven' is a numeral", " 'the desk is brown' is a statement". Carnap thus claimed that potent source of metaphysics are the pseudo-concepts arising out of material mode of speech e. g. thing, material, fact in the above examples. The material mode of speech is philosophically dangerous, though otherwise may be simpler or easier in which to talk. Carnap gives abundant examples from metaphysical statements of Logical Atomists and existentists to bring home his point. So out of this a new brand of linguistic philosophy or formal analysis emerged. What we thought as realities, they were really words. Material mode of speech gives us the impression that we were talking about things or facts, but in fact we were talking about words. This led to the problem how to deal with basic or underived sentences or protocols out of which other complex scientific statements or vocabulary are to be built up. Why a certain syntax of protocol statemement is to be preferred ? This problem leads to the relation between a simple proposition and fact. Thus the old problem of picture theory of meaning and truth reasserts itself. It was hard for Neurath and Carnap to accept this talk about statement and fact, because this is metaphysics arising out of material mode of speech. The talk about fact is a material mode of speech, which needs to be avoided. They wanted to restrict philosophy to mere logical syntax with certain rules of construction and transformation. But the problem was how to account for the validity of protocol statements. So Neurath asserted that we should accept those protocol statements whic have authenticity of acceredited scientists, but why to accept the protocols of these scientists ? Is it not something to do with facts and the relation of fact to language? So Carnap shifted his attention to semantics and many sentences, which he hitherto regarded syntactic, would appear to him semantic. So he declared that the task of philosophy is semantic analysis, wherever it sounds reasonable, although he attached primary importance to syntax.

I think, a new inspiration in linguistic philosophy came up with the return of Wittgenstein to Cambridge in 1929. His philosophical researches during 1933 to 1935 in the shape of *Blue and Brown Books* foreshadow his thoughts in his *Philosophical Investigations*. Earlier Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* was an essentialist holding fast, for example, to the concept of logical form, to the idea of definition having sufficient and necessary characteristics, to the idea of absolutely simple objects, to the picture theory of meaning, to the doctrine of showing, to the one-sided extensional view of the language and corresponding to the independence of simple facts. But now later Wittgenstein rejects all these. For two thousand years the Socratic tradition for the rigidity and precision of concepts was upheld, but Wittgenstein broke this spell. He argued that we cannot have a definition of concept because we do not have necessary and sufficient charecteristics Take the concept of game. There are various sorts of games like card games, board games, Olympic games, ball games, Wittgenstein invites us to observe whether there is any trait common in them, and he urges in these words :

> Don't say "There must be something common or they would not be called `games' bul *look and see* whether there is anything at all For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships... ..

Thus some question of winning is important but this element is missing when a child plays by himself. In some sheer luck counts and in some others even the element of amusement is lacking. What we find is certain 'family resemblance' among the games, just we find certain resemblance among the members of a family as some members have common gait and eye-colour, others may have common eye-colour and the look of face, and some others may have common gait and build, and still some others may have certain common temperament and build Wittgenstein compares the concept with a

thread. Just as there is no fibre which runs throughout the whole length of the thread, so in a concept there is no characteristic which is essential for it. The thread is made up of fibres and its strength lies in how fibres interwine and overlap eachother, so the strength of a concept lies in the fact that its characteristics form a family. The traditional epistemological theories of concept like realism, conceptualism, nominalism all were based on the presupposition that a concept has certain essential characteristics by virtue of which that concept is that concept and that a philosopher needed to give adequate account for the knowledge of such concepts. As Wittgenstein showed this presupposition to be mistaken, there remained no longer any problem. Wittgenstein asserted that the meaning of the concept or word or sentence lies in their use or application or employment. The meaning of a sentence does not lie in how we empirically verify it or how it pictures a fact, but how we use it in our discourse. Wittgenstein emphasizes that language is a form of human activity, and words and sentences, concepts and propositions are tools with which we intersect. As our physical tools serve different purposes, so our linguistic tools serve different roles. Both picture theory and verifiability criterion mistakenly prejudged that the role of language is essentially descriptive. In fact language develops and the function of words and sentences is determined in the contexts in question. We have multiplicity of language games having similarities and dissimilarities. So there cannot be absolute precision : precision is relative. I am invited to attend a dinner party at 4 O'clock, it does not matter if I reach the host's home a few seconds earlier or later. But for certain other purposes a delay of a few seconds would matter much, for example in a space-voyage in the rocket. The concepts of "simple" and "complete" or "complex" are also relative depending upon certain contexts. For example, it makes no sense to talk about absolute simple parts of a chair. In some context a length of one centimeter is simple and in another context one

millimeter or a meter would be simple. In order to know the meaning of the word, we need to observe which language-game we are playing. If we do not pay heed to the lingual use or language-game we fall into the muddled pit of metaphysics. In order to get rid of metaphysical statements, we need to look into the usage of concepts, into various language-games and obtain clarity and release from philosophical blunders For example, concept of logically proper name and its related concept of ultimate simples, concept of private language and private mental ideas and contents, concept of universals are all due to our negligence in not observing how our language functions A demonstrative "this" cannot be understood without context. "This" may refer to a thing's colour or to a thing's shape; it may refer to some of the parts of the thing or to the whole of the thing or to some object compounded together ; or it may refer to the present or absent objects. Thus in connection with Russell's logically proper name he says : "A mental illness could be imagined in which one can use and understand a name in presence of the bearer" (.. . Zettel 714-15). Again we cannot have private language and private mental contents for they need to obrerve certain rules, certain logic, and to play certain role or language-game. But such a language-game cannot be played privately : rules need to be practiced and used in certain context and with other people. Again universals demand precision and uniquenesses in meaning, but meaning is use and employment of words in various games and thus cannot have unique precise usage. So philosophical puzzles are removed by lingual analysis. Through examplifications and elucidations, through visualizing certain situations, through imaging certain events, through conceiving certain possibilities. Wittgenstein would bring out the logical behaviour or usage of word and draw morals from them and thus show how to get rid of metaphysical bewitchment. Thus the proper function of philosophy for him is description of the usage of words ; and not

explanation of certain phenomena. Philosophy is a critique of language. Philosophical puzzles are linguistic confusions and the treatment of the philosopher in question is like the treatment of an illness. An unsuitable types of expression leads to confusion and the philosopher by his linguistic philosophy brings home the real logical behaviour of such expressions. Therefore once he remarked that a person knowing more than one language is in a better position to appreciate the logical behaviour of the word.

It is obvious that later-Wittgenstein is calling us to common-sense approach to philosophy, which Professor Moore was ably putting forward in a common-sensical way. Later Wittgenstein is appealing to the logical behaviour of ordinary language. His thesis is that when we deviate from ordinary acceptable usages of words and sentences we misuse them and unnecessarily entangle ourselves to philosophical or metaphysical problems. In such a case the philosopher so entangled in conceptual cramp needs therapeutic cure, viz. ordinary language analysis in order to make clear the proper usage or logical behaviour of the words concerned. This thesis is against the idea of a perfect language, which logical atomists and logical positivists tried to construct. They thought that the perfect language should be extensional after the pattern exhibited in Russell's *Principia Mathematica*. They completely ignored the obvious that lingual connectives cannot be reduced to truth-functional contents. The paradoxes of material implication evidently betray this common-sensical fact. The result is that philosophers create problems for themselves e.g. problems whether we can know other minds, whether we are really free, whether we realy see physical objects. Observe the various usages of the words like "knowing", "free-willing", "anger", "thinking", "feeling", "reason", "cause", and philosophical puzzles or problems are automatically dissolved. Thus the idea of the Perfect Language depicting the structure of reality is mistaken and misleading.

The aim of Moor's common sensical analysis was limited to refulling idealistic thesis. But the purpose of later-Wittgenstein was wider to encompass whole of philosophy and was anxious to present a general thesis about language, that is to bring out its multifarious functions, vagueness and ambiguities in words, their overlapping logical behaviour and in interpendence etc. By announcing that meaning is use he changed the Weltanschaung of philosophical discourse and gave firm foundation to ordinary language philosophy. His debt to later philosophers, particularly to ordinary language philosophers, cannot be set aside.

It was left to other ordinary language philosophers to analyse language and its implications systematically. They tried to classify philosophical errors due to lingual confusions and tried to study and map out the structure of language, and also endeavoured to draw out certain constructive conclusions. They aiso tried to resolve the semantic problems arising out of such exercises. To study what is for an expression to have meaning, to study the problem of synonymy, to find out certain workable criterion of vagueness and ambiguity, to investigate how in different contexs same words may gain different senses, to classify various meanings of meaning and to eleborate their differences and interrelations e g. between emotive and cognitive meaning, between literary and descriptive uses of words, to explore connection between language and world or reality, are some of the activities with which language philosophers are engaged. An ordinary language may take interest into investigating special features of language used in particular fields e.g. in religion, ethics or poetry. Detailed study of many such things are being carried out by many philosophers. Professor Gilbert Ryle, Professor at Oxford, as early as in1931, pointed in his article "Systematically misleading expression" that grammatical similarities and differences mislead us into thinking that parallel

logical similarities and differences exist in the statements in question and so we fall into philosophical confusions. For example, we may be pursuaded into thinking that just like particulars exist, so universals exist because certain things may be attributed to both of them because of similar grammatical structure. Later on he started making contructive contribution, and not mere clarification, by mapping out logical geography of our conceptual system. This he did by showing how different concepts are related to each other and by showing what can and what cannot be said and inferred by them. In his famous book "Concept of Mind" he is fond of emphasizing the idea of category mistake. Thus mistake originates out of confusing the logic of one category with that of another category. We wrongly think that just as there physical processes there are also mental processes, as if minds belong to the same category as body. So, we are mistakenly led to believe in Cartesian body-mind dualism. So just as there are bodily entities and laws governing bodily processes, so we have mental entities and laws governing mental processes. Just as we have a physical object, so we have mental objects viz. mind. So we are led to have "the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine'. Ryle emphasizes that it is a big mistake of a special kind viz Category mistake. 'It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type, when they actually belong to other'. The ignorance to the category leads to bifurcation of two independent though concurrent bodily and mental phenomena. We wrongly regard that there exist intelligent mental processes like physical processes. In this connection Ryle argues that ascription of intelligence epithets such as 'shrewd' or "silly', 'prudent' or 'imprudent' to a person does not mean that he is unaware of certain facts or has the knowledge or ignorance of certain truth. But it means that he has certain skill or inability to do certain sort of things. Ryle ably argues that we cannot reduce 'knowing how' to 'knowing that'. The conclusion is that it is misleading to suppose that there are certain

mental facts or processes as there are physical ones. Likewise he argues that the sense-datum theory is based on logical howler of categorizing the concept of sensation to that of sense-perception. Sensations are not said to be correct or incorrect, but in observation we raise this question. 'Having a sensation is neither finding out nor trying to find out anything', but observations may be describable as 'careless, cursory or sustained, methodical or haphazard'. 'Sensations are not things, therefore cannot be said to be observable or unobservable', 'Headaches cannot be witnessed, though they can be noticed'. Ryle by such argumentations want to bring home the point that though sensations are regarded 'mental' they cannot be like things Hence there are no mental things, there are physical things. Ryle points out that category mistakes lead to vicious infinite regress and absurdity, hence they are to be avoided For example, if sensatious are treated as observations, then as an observation involves sensation, they lead to further sensations and so on *ad infinitum.*

Another very influential member of Oxford School or Ordinary language School is P.F. Strawson, a Professor at Oxford. He upholds thelogic of ordinary language. We already had occasion to discuss his ideas on Russell's theory of description and on symbolic logic. He ably attacked the idea that every proposition must be either true or false (......a thesis of logical atomism) as in ordinary language we do entertain statements which are neither true nor false. In the same vein he upheld that Aristotelean Square of Opposition and all syllogisms are perfectly valid for our daily speech and their modern symbolic interpretations miss the mark. According to this modern interpretation the Aristotlean universal proposistions viz, A and E are not categorical propositions but hypothetical ones and hence Aristotelean Square of Opposition and several syllogisms break down. I personally do not agree with Strawson's interpretation of

Aristotelean logic in terms of his notion of 'presupposition'. But I do agree with his general thesis, as already pointed out, that the logic involved in ordinary language, e.g. entailment relation, cannot be faithfully exhibited in Russell's symbolic apparatus. The real logical relations are shown in language and not in symbolic logic. Strawson also criticizes semantic theory of truth and says that the word "true" is not used to describe any semantic or other properties, rather its use is to perform different sorts of acts like agreeing, endorsing, emphasizing, conceding, granting. The sentence 'It is true that it is raining' can be stated without loss of factual or descriptive content that it is raining. Hence semantic theory is faulty. Strawson took the concept of "performative" from his colleague Austin and used it to explain the word "true". Through his researches in language and analysis he got interested in descriptive metaphysics, that is describing the actual structure of thought about the world as we see in ordinary language, rather than reproducing or evolving newer or better structure. It has obviously wider interest than ordinary conceptual analysis because it proposes to study the most general features of our conceptual structure. In his book entitled "Individuals" he argues that only material objects are basic particulars, because for their identification and reidentification we can have a uniform system of publicly observable and endurable spatio-temporal entities or reference. Particulars of other kinds cannot be identified without reference to material objects. Furthermore he comes to the conclusion by the usage of the word "person" that the concept of a person is a primitive concept and the concept of mind is derivative from it. There is no Cartesian dualism of body and mind : rather mental states cnd physical properties are ascribable to one and the same object, called person. The concept of a person is not compounded of two different concepts of body and mind. Strawson also painstakingly studies the relation between reference and predication or between subject and predicate. He

examines that in language two concepts or criteria of distinction are found : one distinction is in terms of grammatical subject-predicate form and the other one in terms of particular-universal. He finds certain stresses and strains, certain relatedness and closeness between these two distinctions. Through his further deep study in lauguage he comes to conclude that ultimate distinction lies in the fact how a subject expression introduces a particular in a proposition and how a subject expression introduces a universal in a proposition. He observes that such an introduction is done on the ground that there are present some empirical facts sufficient to identify a particular, but the introduction of universal term in the predicate may not evolve any empirical fact because the meaning of the predicate is sufficient for identification of universal. We can here easily see how Kantian methods are employed in Strawson's linguistic philosophy and how through this method he makes his way to Aristotlelean conclusion.

Another philosopher Professor J. H. Austin (1911-1960) at Oxford argued that there cannot be many logical confusions or muddles in our language because it has survived for a long time. Language can be improved but in general it is not wrong So clarification of ordinary language is extremely important and paramount function of philosophy. So he underakes to elucidate and clarify the forms and concepts in ordinary language. He lamented that sometimes philosophers invent inadequate terminology without paying sufficient heed to ordinary language e.g. sense-datum vocabulary as he discusses in his book "Sense and Sensibilia". An ordinary man perceives and knows the distinction between shadows, images and physical things, therefore the argument of illusion for sense-data is absurd. He started detailed observation on language. He collected synonymous words and studied their uses in literature and observed agreements and disagreements on the principle of reasonable consensus with the hope of evolving a new science out of

his philosophy. He tried to study words used in connection with such concepts as perception, pretension and truth in order to study their logical behaviour. He particularly showed keen interest in verbs, which he called "performative" e.g. promising, naming guaranteeing, granting. The performative sentences, e.g. "I name my dog "Tiger", do not report but perform certain acts. He made distinction of several sorts of sentences and introduced a technical vocabulary for such distinctions. Later on he came to realize that for example the sentences deemed to be performative may not be exclusive of that type and may convey other senses. So he abandoned the distiction between performative and descrive or, what he called, constantive. For example "France is hexagonal" is only a rough description of France and cannot be just true or false. Thus he was obliged to bring in his theory of 'illocutionary forces'. That is, whenever we say something we perform several sorts of acts. He took pains to make distinctions of such forces by introducing new technical vocabulary. So Austin made positive contribution in linguistic philosophy. He never thought that the purpose of linguistic philosophy was restricted to the elimination of philosophical errors and problems as Moore and Wittgenstein evinced in their approach to philosophy. He opined that elimination of philosophical puzzle is only a by product of philosophy of language. Another philosopher Professor Quine (1908) of Harward University contributed excellently in logico. He also studied ordinary language and came to conclude, that as incompatible manuals of translation can be made we cannot translate one language into another.

I have given a very brief survey of philosophy of language starting from revolt against idealism to logical atomism to logical pasitivism to ordinary language philosophy, and from general remarks of Moore to rather detailed analysis of ordinary language by Ryle, Austin, Strawson and Quine and many others. It may be noted that one cannot ultimately avoid one's epistemological and meta-

physical leaning while doing philosophy of language. We saw this in Strawson's descriptive metaphysics. Hypothesis and fact cannot be absolutely separated. Philosophy of language has many facets and each facet may lead eventually to independent discipline. The task of language philosophy is not at all over, rather it has just begun. It is difficulty to foretell the future, but it is hoped that with the advancement of philosophy of language and other sciences we may be able to evolve better philosophical or metaphysical system.